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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE ST ATE OF UTAH,
-vs. ROBERT LEE DIXON,
HATCH & McRAE,

Plaintiff,
Defendant,

Case
No. 11187

Appellants,
WEBER COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah,
Respondent.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
-

Plaintiff,

VS. -

DENNIS A. HUNTER,
HATCH & McRAE,

Defendant,

Case
No. 11199

Appellants,
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,
Respondent.

Brief of Respondent Summit County
NATURE OF CASE
Motion was made to the District Court of Summit
County, State of Utah, by Appellants, in the case entitled
"State of Utah v. Demus A. Hunter,'' for issuance of an
order awarding them a reasonable attorney's fee in connection with their court-appointed representation of De1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendant Dennis A. Hunter and requiring Respondent to
compensate them for the fair and reasonable value of
their services (R. 55). Appellants contended that Respondent was legally obligated under Chapter 64 of Title
77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, added by Chapter Laws
of 1965, to pay them for said services.
DISPOSITION OF THE LO-WER COURT
The Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge of the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, denied
Appellants' motion (R. 75).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the decision of the District
Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Where the word ''Respondent'' is used in this brief
it refers to Summit County and where the word ''Appellants" is used it refers to Robert M. McRae of Hatch
and McRae. Where the word ''Defend ant'' is used it will
refer to Dennis A. Hunter.
Respondeut agrees with the statement of facts set
forth in Appellants' brief, but feels it important to add
that Appellants were appointed to represent Dennis A.
HuntC'r by the District Court of Summit County without the authorization of the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County.
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT I
A COUNTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS
NO STATUTORY OBLIGATION TO PAY
TIE}tSOX~\BLE CO~[PENSATION AND EXPEN"SES TO COUR'r-APPOINTED DEFENSE
COUNSEL, BUT MAY DO SO WHERE THE
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
SUCH CUNTY AUTHORIZES THE COURT
TO APPOINT A QUALIFIED ATTORNEY IN
EACH CASE AND AWARD HIM REASONABLE COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES.
Sections 1 and 2 of Title 77, Chapter 64, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, (cited at pages 5 and 6 of Appellants'
brief) declare certain "minimum standards" to be pro\'ided hy each county for the defense of defendants who
are financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in
eriminal cas<'S. Section 2 provides:
''Assigned counsel shall represent each indigent person who is under arrest or charged with
a crime in which the penalty to be imposed could
be confinement for more than six months in either
jail or prison if:
( 1) The defendant requests it, or
(2) The court, on its own motion or otherwise, so orders, and the defendant does not affirmatively reject of record the opportunity to be
represented.''
This Court in the case of Ruckenbrod v. M11lli11s, 102
et ah 548, 133 P. 2d 325, (1943) said at page 326, P. 2d:
''The majority of jurisdictions hold that an
attonwv is an officer of the court with many rights
and privileges, and must accept his office cum
3
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onere. One of the burdens incident to the office
recognized by custom of the courts for man;
years, is the duty of the attorney to render his
services gratuitously to indigent defendants at
the suggestion of the court.''
We concur with the statement at page 8 of Appellants' brief that "it is fundamental now that a person
who has not intelligently and completely waived his
rights the counsel, and requests the court for appointment of counsel, is entitled to have an attorney represent
him at all stages of the proceedings against him.'' However, we do not concur withe Appellants' contention that
there is a mandatory obligation to provide such services
at county expense. Title 77, Chapter 64, Section 6, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
''The board of county commissioners may, at
county expense, either:
"(1) Authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this act by appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding him reasonable compensation and expenses; or
'' ( 2) Arrange to provide t ho s e services
through nonprofit legal aid or other associations.
If any incorporated city or tovm. wishes to donate moneys for any of the purposes specified in
this section, such action is hereby authorized.''
Appellants' principal argument apparently recognizes and admits that the Board of County Commissioners of Summit County has neither authorized any Court
to provide the services permitted by the act by appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding him
reasonable compensation and expenses, nor arra11ged to
4
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provide those serYices through nonprofit legal aid or
other associations. Appellants contend, however, that
the Court may, even absent any such action on the part of
the Beard of County Commissioners, appoint an attorney
i11 cacl. case awl a ward him reasonable compensation and
expenses anc{ that it is then mandatory that said Board
of County Commissioners pay such compensation and
expenses.
The principal question before this Court "·oulcl appear to be whether the wording of Section 6 of the act
is mandatory or permissive on the question of compensation and expense reimbursement. It is fundamental
law that a statute is to be construed in light of the legislative intent. See McKesson v. Lowery, 51 C. 2d 660, 335
P. 2d 662, California (1959). Before the enactment of
Chapter 64 Title 77, Utah law did not authorize the counties to disburse funds to counsel appointed to represent
indigent defendants in criminal cases. Title 17, Chapter
l 3, Section 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that
the following are county charges:
"(1) Charges incurred against the county by
virtue of any of the provisions of law.

"(2) The necessary expenses of the county
attornev incurred in criminal cases arising in the
county,·· and all other expenses necessarily incurred by him in the prosecution of criminal cases.
" ( 3) The expenses necessarily incurred in the
support of persons charged with or com·icted of
erime and committed therefor to the county jail.
. . .
"(9) Everv other sum directed by law to be
raised for nn); county purposes under the direc-

5
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tiou of the board of county commissioners, or declared to be a county charge."

It is clear from a reading of the foregoing statute
that, even though the necessary expenses of the county
attorney incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, all other expenses necessarily incurred by him in the
prosecution of criminal cases and the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of person charged with or
convicted of crime and committed therefor to the county
jail are made proper county charges, the statute does
not make reasonable compensation and expenses paid to
court-appointed defense counsel a proper county charge.
We recognize that upon the enactment of Section 6 of
Chapter 64 of Title 77, which was added to the Utah
Code by the Chapter Laws of 1965, reasonable compensation and expenses paid by the counties of the State of
Utah to court-appointed defense counsel became a proper
county charge. However, prior to enactment of said Section 6 such a payment of compensation and expenses was
not a proper county charge and the county could not
make the same under any provision of the law.
We believe that the legislature in enacting said Section 6 intended only to make it possible for counties to do
that which they were not permitted by law to do before
enactment of said Section as is evidenced by the use of
the permissive word "may" in said Section. The language used throughout Chapter 64 of said Title 77, where
county charges are discussed, is permissive in nature
and nowhere therein does it appear that the legislature

6
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intended to make it mandatory upon the counties to proYide reasonable compensation and expenses to courtappointed defense counsel.
Section 5 provides :
''The expenses of printing or typewriting
briefs on appeal on behalf of a defendant as well
as depositions and other transcripts are also a
proper county charge." (Emphasis added)
Section 7 provides :

''All expenditures by the counties of incorporated cities and towns which are necessary and
proper to carry out the purposes defined in this
chapter are hereby declared to be legitimate amd
proper uses of public funds and the co1mties and
incorporated areas of this state are hereby authorized to levy and collect taxes for such purposes." (Emphasis added)
Section 6 provides:
"The board of county commissioners may, at
county expense, either: ... " (Emphasis added)
All of the foregoing language used by the legislature is permissive in nature and not mandatory and Respondent contends that had the legislature intended the
act to be mandatory on the question of payment of reasonable compensation and expenses it would have used
mandatory language such as the word "shall" in place
of the word "may."
·whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the legislative intent. See De Witt v. Board
of Supen:isors of the County of San Diego, 53 C. 2d 419,
7
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348 P. 2d 567, California (1960). The word "may" is
sometimes construed as mandatory, but where a means is
not provided for enforcement of the statute in which
the word is used the declaration is directory and not
mandatory. See Goicanlock L Turner, 42 C. 2c1 296, 26i
P. 2d 310, California ( 1954). A direction in a statute is
mandatory where consequences are attached to failure to
act in accordance with the direction. See Whitley v.
S11perior Court in and for Los Angeles County, 113 P.
2d 449, California ( 1941).

in Chapter 64 of Title 77 is a means provided for enforcement of the provisions of Section 6 and
nowhere in said chapter can one find consequences attached to a failure to act in accordance with the provisions of said Section. It was the obvious intent of the
legislature in enacting Chapter 64 of Title 77 to set up
minimum standards to be provided by each county for
the defense of indigent defendants, but to leaYe the means
of providing such minimum standards within the sole
disC'retion of the respective counties and to make it possible> for the counties, only if in their discretion they
choose to do so, to provide compensation for defense
counsel.
~owhere

Respondent contends that proper appointment in
accordance with prescribed statutory procedure by a
C'onrt having authority is a necessary prerequisite to
P<'yrrn·nt of compensation to an attorne~- who has perform0d sen-ices on behalf of an indigent accused. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota, in consiclrring a statute
wl1ieh provided for the appointment of counsel to defend

8
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indigent defendants and allowed reasonable compensation to defense counsel for his services, stated that it was
<lrsirable to set forth a declaration of policy as to the
appointment of attorneys to assist indigent convicted
persons to prosecute an appeal and held that payment for
such services could be authorized only in cases where the
attorney had been appointed to assist the Defendant in
the trial court according to the prescribed statutory procedure. State v. Dahlgren, 259 Minn. 307, 107 N.W.
2d 299, l\Iinnesota (1961).

In volume 18 of ALR 3d at page 1087 it is stated:
''The New York statute with respect to the
assignment of counsel for an indigent defendant
provides that if the defendant appears for an
arraignment without an attorney, he must be
asked if he desires the aid of counsel, and if he
does, the Court must assign counsel to him. Under this statute, it has been held that the validity
of an order purporting to award compensation
for services performed in behalf of the indigent
depends upon the validity of the assignment."
Respondent contends that since the Board of County
Commissioners of Summit County, prior to the appointment by the District Court of Summit County of Appellants to represent Defendant, had taken no affirmative
adim: pursuant to the provisions of 77-64-6, UCA, 1953,
rompensation should not now be awarded to Appellants
since they were not appointed in accordance with the prescrihecl statutory procedure set forth in said section.
Respondent further contends that should the Court
fincl that the language of said Section 6 is mandatory, the

9
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proper remedy would be a Writ of Mandamus brought to
compel the Board of County Commissioners to arrange
for the services provided and that this arrangement
would haYe to be made prior to appointment of counsel
b~, the District Court.
Respondent does not contend that the Legislature of
the State of Utah does not have the power to provide
comprnsation for services rendered by court-appointed
defem:e counsel. What Respondent does contend, howeYer, is that although the Legislature of the State of
Utah has now made it possible for counties to provide
such legal services and to compensate court-appointed
couusel for indigent defendants, it has left the question
of compensation within the sole discretion of the board
of county commissioners of each county and until the
commissioners take some affirmative action, as they are
authorized to do by Section 6 of the act, the Court is not
authorized to fix compensation and order its payment.
·we therefore submit that the ruling of the District
Court should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE PROCEDURE UNDERTAKEN BY APPELLANTS TO SECURE COl\fPENSATION
"\\T AS INAPPROPRIATE.
If, as admitted by Appellants at pages 12 and 1:1
of their hrief, the Governmental Immunity Act does 11ot
apply in this case then they would necessarily han to
look to the Counsel for Indegent Defendants Act (77-64-1
10
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to 7) or the County Claims Act (17-15-10 to 16) for a procedural means of securing the compensation they are
requesting, if they are entitled to any such compensation.
It would appear that the Counsel for Indigent Defendants Act should not apply in this case since the
Board of County Commissioners of Summit County has
not authorized the Court to appoint Counsel and award
them reasonable compensation and expenses (R. 81, pp.
12 and 14) pursuant to the provisions of the act, and the
said act makes no provision for any means of enforcement if compensation is not paid by the county, nor are
there any consequences attached to a failure of the county to provide compensation or to take affirmative action
in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act.
Appellants contend that the Counsel for Indigent
Deft>ndants Act is remedial in nature and that it is entitled to liberal construction in favor of the remedy proYi<led by law or in favor of those entitled to the benefits of the statute. Though the act may be remedial in
nature, still the intention of the legislature as gathered
from the language used must be given full effect. In
:JO Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 393, it is stated:
"As in the case of all statutes, the primary
rule of construction of remedial statutes is to
ascertain, declare and give effect to the intention
of the legislature, as gathered from the language
used .... ''
He:-;pondent contends that it was the intent of the
lT tali State Legislature in enacting the provisions of the
( 'on11s0l for Indigent Defendants Act, on the question of

11
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compensation, only to make it possible for counties to
provide funds for what was not, prior to the enactment
of said act, a proper county charge. The intent of the
Legislature that said act not he mandatory 011 the question of compensation is further supportell lly the fact
that the Legislature did not provide any means of enforcing the provisions of the act nor attach any consPqr<ences to a failure of the counties to act in accordance
with the provisions of Section 6.
No remedy being provided in the Counse1 for Indigent Defendants Act, a claimant must then turn to the
County Claims Act if it has a claim against the County.
Appellants did, in fact, pursuant to the terms and provisions of the County Claims Act, present a written
clnim (R. 67) to Respondent which said claim was rejected (R. 70A). Title 17, Chapter 15, Section 12, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, provides:

"A claimant dissatisfied icith the rejection of
his claim or demand or with the amount allowed
him on his account may sue the county therefor at
any time within one year after the first rejection
thereof by the board, but not afterward. If in
such action judgment is recovered for more than
the hoard allo\ved, costs shall be taxed against the
county, hut if no more is recovered than the board
allowed, costs shall be taxed against plaintiff. On
presentation of a certified copy of the judgment
the hoard must allow and pay the same." (Emphasis added)
If Appellants are dissatisfied with the r0jcction of
thrir elaim their only remedy would be to sue the count)·
the>rc•for within one year after the first rejection thereof
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'

by the Board of County Commissioners. Appellants have

not sued Respondent Summit County in this case and the
case is not, therefore, properly before the Court.
CONCLUSION
rrhe District Court properly denied Appellants' motion for an order awarding them a reasonable attorney's
fee in connection with their court-appointed representation of Defendant. A county of the State of Utah does
not have a statutory obligation to pay reasonable compensation and expenses to court-appointed defense counsC>l, hut may do so where the board of county commissioners of such county authorizes the Court to appoint a
<1nalified attorney and award him reasonable compensation and expenses. The Board of County Commissioners
of Summit County has not authorized the Court to appoint a qualified attorney and award him reasonable
compensation and expenses. The procedure undertaken
by Appellants to secure compensation was an inappropriate procedure and the case is not properly before
the Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT F. ORTON
Summit County Attorney
.Attorney for Respondent
Summit County
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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